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Abstract
In this paper I develop a new approach for identi￿cation and estimation of the parameters
of an oligopoly model, without relying on a potentially unveri￿able equilibrium assumption.
Rather, I consider inference on model parameters when the researcher does not know precisely
what decision rule ￿rms use, but is willing to consider a set of possibilities. In contrast to
traditional approaches in the literature, the proposed methodology allows ￿rm behavior to
vary ￿ exibly across observations, in a manner consistent with many Nash Equilibria. I derive
identi￿cation results for both homogeneous product and di⁄erentiated product markets. Due to
the ￿ exibility a⁄orded to ￿rm behavior, the parameters of ￿rms￿marginal cost functions may
only be set identi￿ed rather than point identi￿ed. The restrictions of the model are, however,
still informative. I ￿nd that the size of the identi￿ed set for marginal cost parameters depends
on the elasticity of market demand, the set of decision rules considered, and the functional
form assumptions imposed. I formulate how to compute consistent set estimates for marginal
cost parameters and demonstrate the proposed methodology with price and quantity data on
the Joint Executive Committee, a 19th century railway cartel. To perform statistical inference
I implement the methodology of Rosen (2005) to construct asymptotically valid con￿dence
regions for the partially identi￿ed marginal cost parameters. The application illustrates how
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1the precision of estimated marginal costs depends on the elasticity of market demand as well as
the extent to which ￿rm behavior is allowed to vary.
1 Introduction
Structural models of oligopoly markets consist of three components: (i) consumers￿demand, (ii)
￿rms￿cost or production functions, and (iii) an equilibrium assumption. Reliable data on marginal
costs are often not available, so marginal costs must be inferred from data on prices and quantities.
When combined with estimates for demand parameters, either estimated in a ￿rst stage or jointly
with the imposed equilibrium conditions, the equilibrium assumption serves to pin down price-cost
margins that can be used to back out marginal costs. Since Rosse (1970) this has been standard
practice in empirical work in industrial organization. It is well recognized, however, that the
implied marginal costs, and in turn the parameters of ￿rms￿marginal cost functions, may then be
quite sensitive to the researcher￿ s choice of an equilibrium assumption.
In this paper, I relax the equilibrium assumption, recognizing that it may not be known to
the researcher which equilibrium ￿rms play, or even if they play equilibrium at all. In lieu of an
equilibrium assumption, I impose weak restrictions on ￿rms￿decision rules that are consistent with
many standard equilibrium assumptions, and I examine the implications of these restrictions for
identi￿cation and estimation of model parameters. This methodology allows empirical researchers
to proceed with estimation when they are uncertain of the precise mechanism by which ￿rms make
their price or quantity decisions, but are willing to impose a more conservative restriction on their
behavior. In particular, I investigate the consequence of imposing restrictions directly on ￿rms￿
price-cost margins that are consistent with many of the equilibrium assumptions that have been
used in the literature, and many sophisticated models of ￿rm behavior.
Even if the researcher is willing to maintain that the ￿rms play an equilibrium, there may be
many di⁄erent plausible equilibria to choose from. In fact, when there is dynamic interaction
among ￿rms over time, microeconomic theory reveals that a multiplicity of equilibria is the norm
rather than the exception.1 Rather than assume that observations correspond to a narrow subset
of these equilibria in order to achieve point identi￿cation, the methodology of this paper allows the
researcher to instead base inference on a set of feasible market outcomes consistent with a large
class of Nash equilibria. The proposed methodology is ￿ exible so that the exact set of equilibria or
decision rules considered can be adapted to those thought most salient for the market of interest.
Estimation of structural parameters is then based on the assumption that observed ￿rm behavior
belongs to this set, rather than a possibly unveri￿able equilibrium selection assumption. The set of
feasible ￿rm decision rules considered can be thought of as implicitly mapping a set of equilibrium
selection rules to implied values for model parameters.
1See, for example, the discussion in chapter 12, pp. 404-405 of Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).
2The cost of the ￿ exibility a⁄orded to ￿rm behavior is that the model is generally incomplete. As
a result, parameters of ￿rms￿marginal cost functions are, except in special cases, only set identi￿ed
rather than point identi￿ed. Even though the marginal cost parameters are not point identi￿ed,
the data will still be informative when the assumptions of the model are imposed. Exactly how
informative depends on the stringency of the imposed behavioral assumptions, functional form
assumptions, and in particular on the elasticity of market demand. This is borne out in the
identi￿cation results of section 4, and illustrated in the empirical application of section 7, which
uses a well-known dataset that includes prices and shipment quantities for a late 19th century
railway cartel, the Joint Executive Committee.
Despite a possible lack of point identi￿cation for marginal cost parameters, this approach has
many advantages. First, it tells the researcher what can be inferred from relatively weak restrictions
on ￿rm behavior. A clear bene￿t of this approach is that it allows the researcher to determine
the extent to which a more restrictive model achieves identi￿cation through its assumptions on
equilibrium behavior. This then enables the empirical researcher to determine how robust their
estimates are to various equilibrium assumptions. In some cases, it may not be clear how ￿rms
set prices or quantities, and di⁄erent researchers may disagree as to how ￿rms make their strategic
decisions or which equilibrium they play. By imposing conservative assumptions on ￿rm behavior
that embed di⁄erent decision rules, researchers who disagree on the precise mechanism by which
price cost margins are actually determined can deduce to what extent their disagreement may e⁄ect
implied parameter values.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of the introduction, I discuss the related
literature. In section 2, I develop the homogeneous products version of the model and place it in
context relative to previous models in the literature. In particular, I formalize the assumptions
imposed on ￿rms￿decision rules that replace the standard equilibrium assumptions. Section 3
extends the model to a di⁄erentiated products market. In section 4, I derive identi￿cation results
for both homogeneous product markets and di⁄erentiated product markets. In each case, under
standard instrumental variable assumptions, the parameters of the demand side of the market
are point identi￿ed, while cost parameters are set-identi￿ed. The identi￿cation results in either
case show that the size of the identi￿ed set for cost parameters depends on the market demand
elasticity(ies). Section 5 discusses estimation. Section 6 provides a simple example of how the
methodology could be applied to a homogeneous product market with a linear inverse demand and
linear marginal cost speci￿cation. Section 7 presents an application to data on prices and quantities
shipped by the Joint Executive Committee, a railway cartel, and details the new estimation method
employed. The application illustrates how the size of the identi￿ed set for marginal cost parameters,
and therefore the precision of inference that can be drawn, depends on the assumptions brought
to bear as well as the elasticity of market demand. Section 8 concludes and discusses avenues for
future research.
31.1 Related Literature
Recent results concerning identi￿cation of model parameters in this setting build on the recent
econometrics literature on partial identi￿cation, covered in depth by Manski (2003). Of the papers
cited there, the identi￿cation results of this paper are most closely related to Manski and Tamer
(2002). However, while Manski and Tamer (2002) focus on single equation estimation when an
outcome variable or regressor is interval measured and all regressors are exogenous, the econometric
model of this paper is composed of simultaneous equations with cross-equation restrictions and
endogenous regressors, which is concisely represented by a set of conditional moment inequalities.
This requires some new techniques for estimation and statistical inference. Some possibilities
include the inferential approaches of Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004), Chernozhukov, Hong, and
Tamer (2004), Shaikh (2005), Beresteanu and Molinari (2006), Pakes, Porter, Ho, and Ishii (2006),
and Rosen (2005). For the empirical example of this paper, I employ the estimator of Rosen
(2005), which is generally applicable for models based on a ￿nite number of moment inequalities.
The estimator takes the form of a minimum chi-square statistic, which has appeared previously in
the statistics literature on multivariate one-sided hypothesis tests.
Research on incomplete econometric models in empirical industrial organization, particularly
when the model admits multiple equilibria, is also a recent and rapidly expanding literature. Exam-
ples that deal with multiple equilibria in models of entry and exit include Andrews, Berry, and Jia
(2004), Tamer (2003), and Ciliberto and Tamer (2004). In the context of an English auction, Haile
and Tamer (2003) use an incomplete model that nests many possible equilibria to estimate bounds
on the distribution of bidders￿valuations. Additional research that seeks to estimate model para-
meters in the presence of multiple equilibria includes Borzekowski and Cohen (2005) and Sweeting
(2005). To my knowledge, in the oligopoly setting I consider, estimation strategies based on only
incomplete knowledge of ￿rms￿pricing and or quantity decisions have not been considered.2
Further discussion of related research in the empirical study of oligopoly models is deferred to
the next section, where the model is formally introduced and placed in further context.
2 A Model For Homogeneous Product Markets
The setting I consider in this section is one in which a researcher observes product price and ￿rms￿
quantities produced, as well as demand and cost covariates in a homogeneous product market for
a large number T periods. In each period of observation, t = 1;:::;T, the market is assumed to
be comprised of the same n ￿rms.3 The econometrician has observations of market price pt and
2There is also a growing literature on estimation of dynamic models of oligopoly. To this point, however, this
research abstracts away from dynamic pricing and/or quantity decisions (for example through tacit collusion), while
instead allowing for dynamics in other decision variables, such as investment or entry/exit decisions. Examples from
the literature include Bajari, Benkard, and Levin (forthcoming), and Pakes, Ostrovsky, and Berry (2005).
3This assumption can be relaxed, but allows for clearer exposition.
4quantities qt = (q1t;:::;qnt). Let xt, wt be (vector-valued) perfectly observed demand and cost
covariates, respectively, at time t. These may in general include market speci￿c components and
may include some common components across ￿rms as well.
Demand in each market is assumed to be determined by the parametric inverse demand function
pt = P (Qt;xt;￿) + ut, (2.1)
Where ut is a mean zero demand shifter such that E[utjwt;xt] = 0, Qt is aggregate time t output, ￿
are parameters to be estimated, and P (￿;x;￿) is downward sloping for all x. Each ￿rm i = 1;:::;n
in period t has marginal costs
mcit = mc(qit;wt;￿i) + ￿it, (2.2)
where ￿it is an additive mean zero cost-shifter such that E[￿itjwt;xt] = 0, and qit is the ￿rm￿ s period
t quantity produced. ￿i are the parameters of ￿rm i￿ s marginal cost function to be estimated,





￿0 is used to denote the composite vector of
all the ￿rms￿marginal cost parameters. This does not exclude the possibility that there are some
common parameters for ￿rms￿marginal cost functions, i.e. that for i 6= j, ￿i and ￿j share some
common components.
To this point, the imposed assumptions are standard in the empirical IO literature. Empirical
models of oligopoly markets always include a speci￿cation of market supply and demand. What
ties the two together is the speci￿cation of an equilibrium assumption. Given the parametric spec-
i￿cation above, di⁄erent equilibrium ￿rm strategies are generally derived from conditions for pro￿t
maximization. However, these pro￿t maximizing conditions are sensitive to the particular game
￿rms are assumed to play, the information structure, and the type of equilibrium assumed. For
example, perfectly competitive, Cournot, and Stackelberg equilibria all lead to di⁄erent conditions
for pro￿t maximization, and thus di⁄erent structural equations from which to derive parameter
estimates. Imposing one of these equilibria then yields a pro￿t maximizing condition of the form




for each ￿rm. It is important to note that this equation is a tautology, as it is completely un-
restrictive without specifying restrictions for ￿it; given values for pt; mcit, and a non-zero value
for Qt
@Pt(Qt;xt;￿)
@Q , there will always exist some ￿it that makes this equation true.4 However, this
condition gives a concise way of embedding di⁄erent static equilibrium assumptions, as di⁄erent
equilibria correspond to di⁄erent values of ￿it, and thus di⁄erent values for ￿rms￿markups. For ex-
ample, Bertrand, Cournot, and monopoly equilibrium pricing correspond to the restrictions ￿it = 0,
￿it = sit, and ￿it = 1, respectively, where sit ￿
qit
Qt, ￿rm i￿ s period t market share. Many empirical
4The only case where it may not seem possible to satisfy equation (2.3) is when
@Pt(Qt;xt;￿)
@Q = 0. In that case,
however, ￿rms are necessarily price-takers so that price equals marginal cost, and any value of ￿it will su¢ ce.
5applications also use a market level version of condition (2.3) such as







sit ￿ mcit and ￿t =
n X
i=1
sit￿it. This market-level version of (2.3) is derived by
summing over i, and weighting each equation by sit, and it also embeds Bertrand, Cournot, and
monopoly pricing as special cases.
Estimation strategies that invoke an equilibrium assumption have identifying power through
the restrictions imposed on ￿it. One restriction in the empirical literature is to specify a particular
static equilibrium for all observations, e.g. marginal cost pricing where ￿it = 0 for all i;t. Another
is to consider a ￿nite number of static equilibria, e.g. competitive, Cournot, and joint pro￿t-
maximization, and then select the one that best ￿ts the data through a formal testing procedure,
e.g. Bresnahan (1987) and Gasmi, La⁄ont, and Vuong (1992). Yet another equilibrium restriction
is the so-called conduct parameter method (CPM), which imposes constancy of ￿it or ￿t across
time, but treats it as a parameter to be estimated. This approach is more general than the ￿rst
two, because although ￿it is assumed constant, it￿ s value is not ￿xed a priori or limited to only a
small number of possibilities. The next section discusses the limitations of imposing constancy of
￿it (or ￿t) in order to motivate the approach developed in this paper. Section 2.2 then describes
how one can replace the standard type of equilibrium assumptions with a more general restriction
that allows ￿it, and thus ￿rms￿markups, to vary ￿ exibly across time.
2.1 Motivation and Discussion of Restrictions on ￿it
The conduct parameter method embeds many di⁄erent static equilibria by combining (2.3), or
the market-level analog (2.4), with the restriction that ￿it (or ￿t, respectively) is constant across
periods. Under the assumption that ￿it = ￿i for all t, it follows that under particular functional
form assumptions and su¢ cient exclusion restrictions ￿i is identi￿ed.5 In this case, the conduct
parameter ￿i can then be consistently estimated jointly with the parameters of ￿rm i￿ s marginal
cost function. Bresnahan (1989) gives a thorough discussion of this approach and surveys its use in
applied work. Variations of the CPM used in empirical research include Iwata (1974), Rubinovitz
(1993), Graddy (1995), Genesove and Mullin (1998), and Wolfram (1999), to name a few.
Solving for ￿it,(2.3) can be rewritten



















@p , the elasticity of aggregate demand, and Lit is the Lerner index, which
is ￿rm i￿ s price-cost margin normalized by price. Generally speaking, there is no reason for this
elasticity-adjusted markup to be constant across periods, unless the ￿rms are playing precisely the
same static equilibrium every period. Furthermore, because ￿it is a function of marginal cost,
price, and the elasticity of demand, it is potentially correlated with any demand or cost shifters;
an advantage of the incomplete model of this paper is that it is robust to this possibility.
While the CPM was in part intended to allow for the possibility of tacit collusion, Corts (1999)
demonstrates that it may yield inconsistent parameter estimates when ￿rms play a tacitly collusive
dynamic equilibrium. If ￿rms are actually playing a repeated game in which they maintain tacitly
collusive behavior by playing a more favorable SPNE than repeated static Nash Equilibrium, the
estimated conduct parameter may be an altogether uninformative measure of ￿rm cooperation.
The underlying issue is precisely that across periods the conduct parameter ￿it need not remain
constant, and is in fact correlated with covariates. In Corts￿framework, the ￿ uctuations in ￿rm
conduct are due to ￿ uctuations in market conditions, i.e. changes in demand or cost covariates
that alter the highest incentive compatible pro￿t levels. Other explanations for ￿ uctuations in the
conduct parameter, such as equilibrium selection from a set of possible SPNE, or the existence
of a competitive fringe, e.g. Salvo (2005), could be posited as well. Through simulation of a
duopoly market for a homogeneous product in a repeated Cournot game, Corts demonstrates that
the estimated conduct parameter need not be consistent for even the average level of ￿rm conduct,
and may in fact be altogether misleading, failing to detect collusive behavior when the average level
of ￿rm conduct is actually close to the highest level achievable. This in turn leads to inconsistent
estimates of ￿rms￿marginal cost parameters. Because the CPM in this case concludes that ￿rms
are behaving more competitively than they in fact are, on average, ￿rm margins are underestimated,
and marginal costs are overestimated.6
Corts￿critique has particular bite because the CPM itself will not reveal whether ￿rms￿conduct
is indeed constant across periods, unless additional a priori assumptions regarding ￿rms￿behavior
are brought to bear. Corts (1999) veri￿es formally that the CPM is not well-suited for markets in
which ￿rm behavior changes signi￿cantly and often over time. Indeed, in the context of the theories
of tacit collusion put forth by Green and Porter (1984), Abreu, Pearce, and Stachetti (1986), and
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), Bresnahan (1989, 1024) writes:
6There are cases where Corts￿critique does not apply. For example, if it is known that ￿rms price at marginal
cost with positive probability, and such periods can be identi￿ed, then marginal costs can be inferred from those
periods. This can in turn be used to infer markups in other periods as well.
7These various theories have in common the idea that in an imperfectly informed
world, ￿successfully￿collusive industries will have periods of cartel pricing and periods
of competition. In general, they imply models with ￿it not necessarily equal to ￿i￿.
These theories di⁄er somewhat in the expected time-series behavior of these two regimes,
as the exact equations determining passage from one regime to the other vary between
theories....It is easy to imagine other theories of success or failure in tacit collusion which
predict di⁄erent patterns; taking all of these theories at once would lead to even more
complex potential time series behavior for ￿.
In this paper I address this issue by putting a bound directly on ￿rms￿markups that is com-
patible with many equilibrium assumptions that have been previously employed. This results
in an incomplete model that is su¢ ciently rich to express a wide-ranging class of possibilities for
time-varying levels of ￿rm collusion. To perform estimation and inference I exploit and build on
￿ndings from the recent literature on identi￿cation and estimation in partially identi￿ed models.
Unlike the conduct parameter method, I do not restrict ￿it to be constant over time. My goal
is not estimation of any sort of conduct parameter, but rather estimation of ￿rms￿marginal cost
functions. Of course, if marginal costs could be estimated with enough precision, then quite a bit
could be inferred concerning ￿rm behavior as well.
In place of an equilibrium assumption, I instead put restrictions directly on ￿rms￿price-cost
margins. Exactly which restrictions are reasonable will be di⁄erent for di⁄erent markets, and the
empirical researcher must, as always, take care to choose assumptions that are appropriate. As a
baseline, I start by positing that ￿rms make their strategic decisions so that their price-cost margins
are positive, but no greater than what could be obtained by a monopolist. While this assumption is
consistent with many types of equilibria, even this rather conservative restriction may be violated
in some markets. Cases where this assumption would not apply are markets where ￿rms may
sometimes price below marginal cost, such as those with predatory pricing or learning by doing,
or cases where some ￿rms can garner price-cost margins greater than the monopoly margin. The
methodology here can, however, be modi￿ed in order to embed those sets of price-cost margins
thought most salient for the market being studied. For this paper, the restriction of ￿rms￿margins
to be between those of perfect competition and monopoly levels will be the most lenient considered.
Restrictions that are not nested by this one are left to future research.
2.2 Restrictions on Firms￿Markups
Under the assumption that ￿rms have perfect information (i.e. they observe ￿it and ut), mar-
ginal cost pricing for ￿rm i is given by pt = mcit, while monopoly pricing yields pt = mcit ￿
Qt
@P
@Q (Qt;xt;￿) for each active ￿rm in period t. Thus, restricting price-cost margins to lie between
8these two extremes yields
8t = 1;:::;T; i = 1;:::;n




This restriction imposes upper and lower bounds on ￿rms￿marginal costs in each period of ob-
servation, in contrast with conventional equilibrium assumptions that pin down marginal costs to
a singleton. This weaker restriction on ￿rms￿marginal costs is the reason why marginal cost
parameters may only be set identi￿ed, rather than point identi￿ed.
More generally, I consider restrictions of the form












it, either perfectly observed or imposed a priori by the researcher, serve as known
lower and upper bounds, respectively, on ￿rm i￿ s elasticity-adjusted Lerner index, or equivalently,
on ￿rm i￿ s markup as measured as a portion of the monopoly markup. The perfectly competitive
and monopoly bounds are given by ￿0
it = 0, and ￿1
it = 1 for all i;t. Another case would occur if
￿rms were known to be quantity setters, and assumed never to have margins any lower than that
achieved by Cournot equilibrium. Then ￿0
it = sit for all i;t, where sit is ￿rm i￿ s market share.
An equivalent formulation is that











where ￿it captures the value of the true price-cost margin relative to the would-be monopoly margin.
As this notation suggests, the price-cost margin bounds can be explicitly derived from the conduct
parameter paradigm. However, this approach is inherently di⁄erent from the CPM because the
period t conduct parameter is allowed to take any value between ￿0
it and ￿1
it, and no restrictions
are placed on the evolution of that parameter over time. There is no ￿structural￿parameter ￿it
to be estimated. Rather, ￿it simply o⁄ers one way to parameterize the distance of price from
marginal cost, on the scale of ￿Qt
@P
@Q (Qt;xt;￿). For any ￿rm and period, the set of ￿it allowed
imposes restrictions on ￿rm markups, and the speci￿c values of ￿it o⁄er a parameterization of the
unobserved level of ￿rm i￿ s period t markup.
With suitable choice of ￿0
it and ￿1
it the restriction (A**) can easily be made less restrictive
than many standard equilibrium assumptions. Such restrictions are, however, not automatically
satis￿ed. In particular, for a given period of observation t, ￿Qt
@P
@Q (Qt;xt;￿) does not measure the
9monopoly markup of the industry, but rather the implied markup if observation t were in fact one
in which monopoly power was exercised. For example, if the ￿rms were in fact playing a Cournot
equilibrium in period t, then the value of ￿Qt
@P
@Q (Qt;xt;￿) would not be the same as if Qt were
instead at the monopoly level. It is worth stressing that both of these restrictions, and particularly
the former, are less stringent than those typically imposed by researchers to infer markups, either
through the conduct parameter method or by imposing a static Nash Equilibrium. Nonetheless,
care must be taken by the researcher to impose reasonable restrictions on ￿rms￿decision rules
on a case-by-case basis. For now, I consider the implications of imposing bounds on each ￿rms￿
elasticity-adjusted markups, but appropriate bounds must be carefully chosen to suit the application
at hand.
2.3 Implications From Cross Section and Time Series Data
In this subsection I brie￿ y discuss the di⁄erences between the cases of cross section and time series
data. First, consider the case of cross section data, where t is instead an index for each distinct
market at a ￿xed point in time. If the markets are truly distinct in the sense that there is no
cross-market ownership, then the equilibrium behavior that dictates the outcomes in each market
can be treated as independent, conditional on market covariates. That is, it may be reasonable
to invoke an assumption such as Pf￿itjw;xg = Pf￿i￿jw;xg for all t 6= ￿. If, instead, some of the
same ￿rms are active in di⁄erent markets, such an assumption may not be plausible. However, it
may in this case be reasonable to impose a restriction on ￿rm conduct when the same ￿rms appear
in di⁄erent markets, e.g. ￿it = ￿i￿ for all markets t;￿ with the same set of ￿rms present.
This is di⁄erent from the case of time-series data in a single market. In this case, reasonable
patterns of ￿rm behavior across time can be considered. The folk theorem dictates that repeated
interactions among ￿rms results in a wealth of SPNE. However, if the researcher is able to cred-
ibly impose restrictions on the time-varying behavior of ￿rms, such as those considered by Green
and Porter (1984)7 or Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), then these restrictions could potentially be
imposed for greater identifying power.
The key point is that the time series and cross section data have very di⁄erent implications
for plausible restrictions on ￿rm behavior. When the researcher has panel data, both types of
assumptions on ￿rm behavior could potentially be imposed, with those of the ￿rst type being
applied across markets at each point in time, and the latter being applied in each market (or for
each set of ￿rms in a single market) across time. For now I simply restrict attention to ￿rm
behavior resulting in a wide range of static outcomes.
7The Green and Porter framework is one in which ￿rms have incomplete information with respect to demand,
while I focus attention on situations in which ￿rms have perfect information. The current methodology could, at
least in theory and with some care, also be extended to situations where ￿rms have incomplete information as well.
103 A Model for Di⁄erentiated Product Markets
Now I turn to the more complex case of di⁄erentiated product markets. For this case, I assume
throughout that each ￿rm￿ s marginal costs are constant with respect to quantity, but may di⁄er
with period t covariates. As a starting point, I consider the di⁄erentiated product oligopoly
framework of Nevo (1998) with the added simpli￿cation that each ￿rm in the market produces one
and only one di⁄erentiated product. There are J di⁄erentiated products in the industry, and thus
J ￿rms, and the demand for each product at a given point in time in a single market is
Qjt = Qj (pt;xt;￿) + ujt, (3.1)
where pt = (p1t;:::;pjt) is the price vector of di⁄erentiated products, xt are covariates, ￿ are
parameters to be estimated, and ujt is a demand shifter for product j that is observed by the ￿rms
prior to making their decisions, but is not observed by the econometrician. The notation Q(p;x;￿)
denotes the vector-valued function (Q1 (pt;xt;￿);:::;QJ (pt;xt;￿))
0. The variable pro￿t (i.e. not
counting ￿xed costs) of ￿rm j in period t is thus
￿jt = (pjt ￿ mcjt) ￿ Qjt, (3.2)




+ ￿jt is a function of the exogenous cost shifters wt, the parameters ￿j,
and the cost shifter ￿jt. Like ujt, each ￿jt is assumed to be observed by the ￿rms prior to making
their decisions, but unobserved by the econometrician. A Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices is
then characterized by the equations
Qjt + Djjt (pjt ￿ mcjt) = 0, (3.3)
for all j 2 f1;:::;Jg, where w;x;￿;￿j have been suppressed for convenience, and where Dkjt ￿
@Qk(pt;xt;￿)
@pj , the time t cross-price elasticity of product k with respect to pj.8 This set of equations
derived from the assumption of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium can then be used to solve for each
product￿ s markup. If, however, the ￿rms are not playing a Bertrand-Nash equilibrium every period,
estimated markups and marginal cost parameters based on these equations will be inconsistent.
There are many reasons for departure from Bertrand-Nash equilibrium, including the possibility of
other static equilibria (e.g. Cournot), collusion on the part of some or all of the ￿rms, and market
dynamics.
Another way of performing inference on model parameters is the so-called menu approach. The
idea is to consider a ￿nite number of possibilities for equilibrium behavior and corresponding ￿rst
order conditions. Which condition is appropriate in a given setting can be tested, as done by
8Dkjt is not a function of t, but may vary with pt and xt.
11Gasmi, La⁄ont, and Vuong (1992), for example, or can be chosen according to the researcher￿ s
judgement. Nevo (1998) summarizes this approach by writing (3.3) in vector notation
Qt ￿ ￿(pt￿mct) = 0,
where ￿ is the identity matrix, and Qt, pt, mct denote the vector of all ￿rms￿period t quantities
produced, prices, and marginal costs. The menu approach entertains the possibility that subsets
of ￿rms in the industry collude. If a subset of ￿rms in the industry are colluding, the system
of equations is modi￿ed by setting ￿ij = 1 as well for any combination of ￿rms i and j that
collude. The conduct parameter approach instead allows each ￿ij, i 6= j, to take any value on
[0;1], but maintains the restriction that the ￿ij are constant across observations. Given this
restriction, the researcher could, in principle, hope to estimate the matrix of conduct parameters
￿. Nevo (1998) makes the point that even in this case, it will often be extremely di¢ cult to have
enough instrumental variables to identify these parameters. Even if we did have enough exclusion
restrictions to identify the conduct parameters, the argument of Corts (1999) still applies. Both
the menu approach and the conduct parameter method have the inherent shortcoming that ￿ij
is ￿xed across periods of observation; as in the homogeneous products case, this is exactly the
restriction I relax, and I thus add the subscript t to ￿ij to re￿ ect this.
Equation by equation, we have 8j 2 f1;:::;Jg, 8t,
Qjt + (pjt ￿ mcjt)Djjt +
X
k6=j
￿jkt (pkt ￿ mckt)Dkjt = 0.
for some set of values of ￿ijt, where again Dkjt ￿
@Qk(pt;xt;￿)
@pj . As in the case of homogeneous
products, the requirements for identi￿cation of Q(pt;xt;￿) are exactly the same as they are under
the assumption of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium. Estimation of the demand-side parameters is well-
studied9, so I will again assume that these are observed. Isolating mcjt in the above equation, it
follows that for all products j = 1;:::;J,
mcjtDjjt = pjtDjjt + Qjt +
X
k6=j
￿jkt (pkt ￿ mckt)Dkjt. (3.4)












= [0;1] for all j;k;t combinations, encapsulating a set of decision rules ranging
from Bertrand-Nash Equilibrium to jointly collusive behavior. Assuming that pkt ￿ mckt ￿ 0 for
9See Nevo (2000) for references.
12all observations,10 Dkjt ￿ 0 for j 6= k and Djjt ￿ 0, it follows that for all products j = 1;:::;J,




jkt (pkt ￿ mckt)Dkjt, (3.5)




jkt (pkt ￿ mckt)Dkjt. (3.6)
In a perfect information game in which all marginal cost and demand errors are perfectly observed,
it simply follows that these inequalities must hold over all observations. Since demand can be
identi￿ed under the standard assumptions, consistent estimates for demand parameters can be
obtained in a ￿rst stage regression. For ease of notation I impose throughout the remainder of






= [0;1] for all j;k;t, although






follows the same logical steps.
Thus, in a perfect information setup only marginal costs are unobserved to the econometrician.
In order to compare the implications of these restrictions to models that impose equilibrium behav-
ior that pins down marginal costs, it is useful to rewrite the above inequalities isolating marginal
costs:









mcjt ￿ pjt + D￿1
jjtQjt, (3.8)
for all j = 1;:::;J. This system of inequalities essentially says that the period t vector of ￿rms￿
marginal costs mct = (mc1t;:::;mcJt)
0 is known to belong to a subset of RJ. Because of the exis-
tence of cross-price elasticities in a di⁄erentiated product market, there are a plethora of restrictions
across the bounds on each ￿rm￿ s marginal costs. That is, in contrast to the homogeneous product
case, the bounds for each ￿rm￿ s marginal costs include all of the other ￿rms￿marginal costs. If
marginal costs are equal across all ￿rms, so that mct is a scalar, then this complication no longer
exists. Formal identi￿cation results are provided in section 4.2.
4 Identi￿cation
4.1 Homogeneous Product Industries
Let qt ￿ (q1t;:::;qnt)
0 and ￿t ￿ (￿1t;:::;￿nt)
0 denote the vector of period t ￿rm quantities produced
and marginal cost errors. Throughout, I use (q;p;x;w;u;￿) to denote a representative realization
of (qt;pt;xt;wt;ut;￿t). Let the observations f(ut;￿t) : t = 1;:::;Tg be a random sample distributed
10I am assuming here that all pairs of di⁄erentiated products are gross substitutes. This formulation excludes the
case where two of the products are complements.
13P such that E[u;￿jx;w] = 0. (x;w) are assumed to have bounded support, and (q;p) are assumed
to have nonnegative, bounded support. I assume throughout that ￿rms observe (u;￿) prior to
making their decisions. Firms￿decision rules and market demand jointly determine the realization
of (q;p) as a function of (x;w;u;￿). For clarity I use X;W to explicitly denote X;W as random
variables and x;w to denote representative realizations. Thus, E[mc(qi;W;￿i)jX;W] is a random
variable, while E[mc(qi;w;￿i)jx;w] is the particular value of E[mc(qi;W;￿i)jX;W] for X = x
and W = w. Formally, these assumptions are summarized below. B denotes the parameter space
within which ￿ is assumed to belong, and B￿ is used to denote the identi￿ed set for ￿. That is,
B￿ is the subset of marginal cost parameters that are logically consistent with the restrictions of
the model.
Assumption: (A1) Each component of (q;p) has nonnegative, bounded support. (X;W) have
bounded support X,W, respectively.
Assumption: (A2) E[u;￿jX;W] = 0.
Both of these assumptions are standard. A further assumption is




Assumption (A3) is motivated by the observation that the parameters of the inverse demand
equation are identi￿ed under the same exclusion restrictions as in traditional, point identi￿ed mod-
els. In the inverse demand equation (2.1) Qt is endogenous, since the ￿rms observe ut before
making their decisions. As in standard models, endogeneity can be handled with appropriate in-
struments for Qt, for which the cost covariates wt are immediate candidates. Because identi￿cation
of the parameters of a single equation using instrumental variables is well studied and not the focus
here, I assume that the researcher does indeed have enough exclusion restrictions to identify and
estimate inverse demand independently of the marginal cost function. In the linear example of
section 6, and the empirical application of section 7, this condition is easily seen to be met, so that
the parameters of the demand equation are identi￿ed.11 Thus, for the purpose of identi￿cation, I
restrict attention to the case where the parameters of the demand function are identi￿ed and can be
consistently estimated, perhaps, for example, by a ￿￿rst-step￿regression. Thus for the remainder
of this section I treat the inverse demand function and hence its derivative with respect to Q as
observed.
I also assume throughout that the inverse demand function is continuously di⁄erentiable and
downward sloping.
Assumption: (A4) P (￿;x;￿) is continuously di⁄erentiable in Q and
@P(￿;x;￿)
@Q < 0 for all x 2 X.
As a preliminary step for identi￿cation the following proposition derives a bound for expected
11If P (Qt;xt;￿) is linear in Qt, then all that is required is that for some component of wt, w1t, cov (Qt;w1t) 6= 0
and E [utw1t] = 0. The ￿rst condition is satis￿ed because ￿rms take the demand unobservable into account when
choosing their strategy, while the second will be satis￿ed by assumption; indeed I invoke the stronger assumption
E [utjwt] = 0.
14marginal costs conditional on exogenous covariates under (A**) and (A1)-(A4).
Proposition 1 Let (A1)-(A4) and (A**) hold. Then 8(x;w) 2 (X;W), for each i = 1;:::;n;
mci (x;w) ￿ E[mc(qi;w;￿i)jx;w] ￿ mci (x;w), (4.1)
where


















Proof.All proofs are included in the Appendix.
When instead a particular equilibrium is imposed, then a moment equation is obtained from
each ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order condition, which can then be used to estimate the parameters of their marginal
costs. Now however, due to the incomplete knowledge of ￿rms￿decision rules, a set of possible
moment equations must be considered, as mc(qi;w;￿i) is only known to lie between mci (x;w)
and mci (x;w). The previous proposition shows that the conditional expectation of (A**) with
respect to the distribution of (u;￿1;:::;￿N) bounds the value of ￿rms￿marginal costs conditional on
exogenous covariates.
Condition (4.1) is a system of conditional moment inequalities, for each ￿rm i, that are im-
plied by the restrictions on ￿rms￿decision rules. This system may in general have cross-inequality
restrictions, complicating the analysis, much like simultaneity in a system of equations. In the
special case where ￿rms share no common cost parameters, this complication is not present. Fur-
thermore, the presence of the endogenous variables q is a complication in this model just like it is
in traditional, point identi￿ed models. In particular, the endogeneity of q means that marginal
costs may vary with the demand covariates x indirectly through q.
While ￿ will in general not be point identi￿ed, the above inequalities do place meaningful
restrictions on expected marginal costs conditional on covariates, and thus on ￿. Exactly what
can be learned as a consequence of the bounds given by Proposition 1 will depend on the particular
functional form assumptions imposed, and what quantities are identi￿ed by the sampling process.
For example, if one is only interested in bounds for E[mc(qi;w;￿i)jx;w] for each combination of
(x;w), then identi￿cation of the conditional expectation functions mci (x;w) and mci (x;w) will
su¢ ce. If instead the goal is inference on the marginal cost parameters ￿, then more will be
required if mc(qi;w;￿i) depends on qi. The extent to which (4.1) has identifying power for ￿
depends on which components of the inequality are identi￿ed by the sampling process. Thus, to
further characterize the implications of (A**) for the identi￿ed set for ￿, I restrict mc(qi;w;￿i) to
fall in the class of parametric forms of assumption (A5).
15Assumption: (A5: additive separability) mc(qi;w;￿i) = f (w;￿i) + g (qi;￿i).
This assumption embeds a number of functional forms from the literature. In particular,
constant marginal costs and linear marginal costs are included. When assumption (A5) is violated,
Proposition 1 still restricts the feasible values for ￿, and these could be examined on a case-by-case
basis. When (A5) holds, the following additional high-level assumption, along with condition (4.1),
can be used to obtain the identi￿ed set for ￿ of Proposition 2.
Assumption: (A6: identi￿cation of conditional expectations) For all (x;w) 2 (X;W), i =
1;:::;n, mci (x;w); mci (x;w), and E[g (qi;￿i)jx;w] are identi￿ed.
Exactly which conditions guarantee that assumption (A6) holds depend on the functional form
of both the inverse demand and marginal cost function. If, for example, inverse demand and











and E[qitjx;w] will su¢ ce. Given su¢ cient regularity conditions, each of these
conditional expectations can then be consistently estimated.
Proposition 2 proceeds to characterize the identi￿ed set for ￿, the composite vector of all ￿rms￿
marginal cost parameters ￿i, under these additional assumptions.
Proposition 2 Assume that (A**) and (A1)-(A6) hold. Then the identi￿ed set for ￿ is
B￿ = \i=1;:::;n
(




Corollary 1 Assume that (A**) and (A1)-(A6) hold. For any ~ x contained in the support of X,
de￿ne Q(~ x) ￿
n
Q : @P
@Q (Q; ~ x;￿) = 0
o
, the set of values of Q such that @P
@Q (Q; ~ x) = 0. Then
E[mc(qi;W;￿i)jW = w] is identi￿ed if PrfQ 2 Q(~ x)j~ x;wg = 1. Furthermore, if there is a value
of the demand covarites x￿ such that @P
@Q (Q;x￿) = 0 for any Q, then E[mc(qi;W;￿i)jW = w] is
identi￿ed for all w such that (x￿;w) lies on the support of X;W.
Proposition 2 characterizes the identi￿ed set for the marginal cost parameters, and forms the
basis of the estimation strategy developed in section 5. The ￿rst corollary veri￿es that ￿rms￿
expected marginal costs conditional on covariates w are point-identi￿ed if, conditional on w, there is
probability one of a realization of demand covariates ~ x such that demand is in￿nitely elastic. While
it may not in general be reasonable to expect demand to be in￿nitely elastic for any hypothesized
value of demand covariates, this corollary is still worth mention for two reasons. First, if demand
is indeed in￿nitely elastic conditional on some set of observables, then ￿rms must be price-takers,
and marginal costs can be recovered since it must be that price equals marginal cost. Thus, this
presents one case in which we would expect the researcher to be able to identify mean marginal
costs, and indeed this methodology satis￿es that criteria. Second, identi￿cation need not be viewed
as an ￿all-or-nothing￿proposition. The corollary presents the limiting case of the observation that
16the more elastic the aggregate demand function, the smaller will be the identi￿ed set for marginal
costs and, in turn, the identi￿ed set for marginal cost parameters B￿.
In particular, this characterization of the identi￿cation region reveals that the size of the identi-
￿ed set is sensitive to the distribution of Q@P
@Q (Q;x;￿) = p￿￿￿1, where ￿ is the elasticity of quantity
demanded with respect to price. This result is rather intuitive: if demand is highly elastic, then
there is less potential for price manipulation on the part of the ￿rms, since small changes in price
have a large e⁄ect on quantity demanded. If, on the other hand, demand is inelastic, then there is
more potential for collusive ￿rms to pro￿t, as consumers will not modify their purchasing behavior
as much in the face of higher prices. Furthermore, as the polar case of Corollary 1 also illustrates,
a relatively small identi￿cation region does not require the elasticity to be uniformly high. Rather,
if the elasticity is su¢ ciently high on average over a broad enough range of covariate values, a small
identi￿cation region may be obtained.
A second corollary shows that if marginal costs are linear, then B￿ is convex. Knowledge that
the identi￿ed set is convex may also be useful to ease the computational burden of estimating B￿.




￿0, then B￿ is convex.
4.2 Di⁄erentiated Product Industries
In this section I derive formal identi￿cation results for marginal cost parameters for the case of dif-
ferentiated products. The starting point for characterizing the identi￿ed set is equation (3.4). The
environment and the notation follow that of section 3 as closely as possible. Let ￿t ￿ (￿1t;:::;￿nt)
0
and ut = (u1t;:::;uJt)
0. Using notation similar to that of the homogeneous products framework,
I use (q;p;w;x;u;￿) to denote representative observations of (qt;pt;wt;xt;ut;￿t). Formally, the
sampling process consists of a random sample of draws of (x;w;u;￿) from population (￿;￿;P).
The measure P induces a conditional probability measure over (u;￿) for each possible realization
of (x;w) such that the conditional expectation of (u;￿) given (x;w) is zero. Firms￿decision rules
and market demand determine the realization of (q;p) as a function of (x;w;u;￿). As before, I
use X;W to explicitly denote the covariates as random variables and x;w to denote representative
realizations. B denotes the parameter space within which ￿ is assumed to belong, and B￿ is used
to denote the identi￿ed set for ￿.
Assumption: (B1) Each component of (q;p) has nonnegative, bounded support. (X;W)
have bounded support X ￿ W, respectively.
Assumption: (B2) E[u;￿jX;W] = 0.
As in the case of homogeneous products, I assume that the dimension of w, the variables
excluded from the demand speci￿cation, are su¢ cient to identify the parameters of the demand
speci￿cation, ￿. The requirements for identi￿cation of ￿ are no di⁄erent that those of models
where ￿rms are assumed to play a particular equilibrium.
17Assumption: (B3) ￿ is identi￿ed.




+ ￿jt for each j and taking conditional expectations of the






















Dkj (pk ￿ mck (w;￿k) ￿ ￿k)jx;w
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is not identi￿ed without adding
more structure, since the marginal cost shifters ￿k are not observed by the econometrician. In
particular, if the demand derivatives Dkj depend on the price of goods aside from good j, then
we might expect that Dkj and ￿k are correlated, even after conditioning on x and w, since ￿k is
correlated with pk. Thus, I impose the restriction that the demand function for each product j is
linear in prices, which implies that the cross-price derivatives Dkj are constant.
Assumption: (B4) Qj (p;x;￿) = ￿pj ￿ p + h(￿xj;x), where ￿pj = (Dj1;:::;DjJ)
0, and ￿xj are
those components of ￿ through which ￿rm j￿ s marginal cost function depends on covariates x.
Assumption: (B5) E[pjx;w] is identi￿ed on X ￿ W.
Under these additional assumptions, proposition 3 gives the identi￿ed set for the marginal cost
parameters ￿.
Proposition 3 Let Dkj > 0 for all k 6= j, and Djj < 0. Assume that (B1)-(B5) hold, and that




> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
￿ 2 B : E[pjjX;W] + D￿1
























> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
.
Corollary 3 If mcj (w;￿) = wj ￿ ￿j for all j 2 J, where wj;￿j are subvectors of w and ￿, respec-
tively, then B￿ is convex.
As was the case for homogeneous good industries, the identi￿cation result given by proposi-
tion 3 can be used as the basis to estimate B￿ as outlined in the following section. However,
doing so appears to be generally rather di¢ cult computationally. In comparison with the homoge-
neous products model, there are many more terms in the inequalities that de￿ne the identi￿ed set.
Furthermore, the bounds on each ￿rms￿marginal cost functions are functions of the other ￿rms￿
18(set-identi￿ed) marginal costs. The corollary provides su¢ cient conditions for the identi￿ed set to
be convex, which as in the homogeneous product case may be useful for estimation.
5 Estimation
The approach I take here in either homogeneous product or di⁄erentiated product industries is
to estimate the model in two steps. The idea is to ￿rst estimate the parameters of the demand
speci￿cation, and then use these ￿￿rst-step￿estimates to estimate the identi￿ed set for the marginal
cost parameters. To perform the second stage, I formulate a population level objective function
that attains its minimum only on those values of the cost parameters that belong to the identi￿ed
set. Estimation then proceeds by computing the set of approximate minimizers of the sample
analog of this objective function.
For estimation of the model one can use a standard GMM procedure as a ￿rst step to estimate
demand parameters, and a modi￿ed minimum distance (MMD) estimator as de￿ned by Manski
and Tamer (2002) to estimate the identi￿ed set B￿. MMD estimation is a straightforward method
for constructing a sample analog of the identi￿ed set. First, the researcher de￿nes a population
objective function of model parameters Q that is minimized only on the identi￿ed set. This is
achieved by constructing a nonnegative valued function that takes the value zero if and only if




Estimation of B￿ then proceeds by constructing a sample analog for the objective function, ^ QT
such that ^ QT converges uniformly almost surely to Q over the parameter space B. Then one
computes the set of approximate minimizers of ^ QT,
^ B￿ =
￿
￿ 2 B : ^ QT (￿) ￿ min
b2B
QT (b) + ￿T
￿
,
where ￿T # 0 at an appropriate rate as T ! 1. Under su¢ cient regularity conditions, ^ B￿ converges
to B￿ in the Hausdor⁄ metric as T ! 1. The need for the sequence of ￿T is the same as that of
Manski and Tamer (2002). That is, in order to guarantee that ^ B￿ contains the boundary of B￿
asymptotically as T ! 1, the inequalities that de￿ne the identi￿ed set must be relaxed slightly.
The consistency proofs of their paper are generally applicable for MMD estimation based on any
nonnegative objective function that is only equal to zero on the identi￿ed set, and for which there
is a uniformly consistent estimator. Under su¢ cient regularity conditions, ^ B￿ is consistent for B￿
in the Hausdor⁄ metric, as long as ￿T converges to zero no faster than ^ Q converges to Q.
While Manski and Tamer (2002) showed that MMD estimators for set identi￿ed parameters are
19generally consistent, they did not devise a method for statistical inference for MMD estimators.
Indeed, constructing con￿dence regions for partially identi￿ed parameters is a ￿eld of current
research. To perform inference for the empirical example of section 7, I use the modi￿ed minimum
distance estimator developed in Rosen (2005), which is applicable in models that can be written as
a ￿nite number of conditional moment inequalities. The MMD objective function of that paper
has the advantage that the asymptotic distribution of T ￿ ^ QT (￿) is chi-bar-square. As described
in that paper, this result can then be used to construct asymptotically valid con￿dence sets for the
parameter ￿, even if it is only partially identi￿ed.
While the model used for the application of section 7 can be written as a ￿nite set of moment
inequalities, the general methodology of this paper can result in models that do not ￿t within that
framework. In this case, one would need to use a di⁄erent inferential approach to construct con￿-
dence sets for ￿. Other recent papers that devise a way to perform inference in partially identi￿ed
models and could potentially be applied include Andrews, Berry, and Jia (2004), Chernozhukov,
Hong, and Tamer (2004), Shaikh (2005), Beresteanu and Molinari (2006), and Pakes, Porter, Ho,
and Ishii (2006).
The inferential approach I employ from Rosen (2005) uses the set of moment inequalities implied
by the model as a basis for estimation, and I brie￿ y outline that approach here. Because the
covariates in the application have discrete support, the identi￿ed set for ￿ implied by proposition
























where the inequality applies to each element of the moment vector E[m(q;p;x;w;￿;￿)]. ￿ is
consistently estimated in a ￿rst stage by GMM, using the observed cost shifter w as an instrumental




(E[m(q;p;x;w;￿;￿)] ￿ t)V ￿1
￿;￿ (E[m(q;p;x;w;￿;￿)] ￿ t),
where V is the variance matrix of the vector m(q;p;x;w;￿;￿). Notice that, as a function of ￿,
evaluated at the true value of ￿, Q(￿;￿) = 0 if and only if (5.1) is satis￿ed, so that Q(￿;￿) is
indeed a modi￿ed minimum distance objective function. To estimate the identi￿ed set for ￿, I use
the sample objective function
^ QT (￿) = min
t￿0
￿





^ En [m(q;p;x;w; ^ ￿;￿)] ￿ t
￿
,
where ^ En denotes the sample mean and ^ V￿ is the sample variance of m(q;p;x;w; ^ ￿;￿), corrected
20by means of the delta method to account for the fact that ^ ￿ is separately estimated. Under mild
regularity conditions, if ￿ 2 B￿, violations of ^ QT (￿) = 0 are attributable to no more than sampling
variation. To build con￿dence sets for ￿, I then make use of the asymptotic distribution of statistics
of the form T ^ QT (￿) as derived in Rosen (2005).
6 A Simple Example: A Linear Model with Instruments
In order to illustrate the proposed methodology before proceeding to the empirical example of
section 7, in this section I consider a simple linear model. The model has both demand and supply
shifters that serve as instruments. The market is for a homogeneous good with single period inverse
demand function
pt = a0 + a1xt + a2Qt + ut. (6.1)
Further suppose that two ￿rms compete for consumers in each period of observation, and that each
has constant marginal costs given by the following functional form
mci (qit;wt) = c0i + c1iwt + ￿it. (6.2)
As before, t indexes the observation, while i = 1;2 indexes the ￿rms. ut is an unobserved period
t demand shifter, while ￿1t;￿2t are unobserved marginal cost shifters. ￿1t;￿2t and ut are assumed
to be iid mean zero, independent of each other, and uncorrelated with all of the regressors, so that
E [￿1t;￿2t;utjxt;wt] = 0. These additive demand and marginal cost shifters (ut;￿it) are perfectly
observed by each ￿rm i, but unobserved by the econometrician. The variables pt;q1t;q2t;wt;xt are
all observed by the ￿rms and by the econometrician.
Firms play a repeated quantity-setting game in a market characterized by these linear inverse
demand and linear marginal cost functions. Following the behavioral assumptions considered in
section 2, they are assumed to play strategies in each period that satisfy the inequalities (A**). In












for all i;t pairs. The structural parameters to be estimated in this model are a0;a1;a2;c01;c02;c11
and c12. In this case, wt is correlated with Qt through the ￿rms￿supply relation, but is not
correlated with the demand errors by assumption. Thus, wt can be used as an instrument for
quantity supplied in estimation of the linear demand equation, and the demand parameters are
identi￿ed and can be consistently estimated. An instrument for quantity demanded, xt is also
available in this model, but the traditional IV techniques are not applicable for estimation of the
supply-side parameters c0 and c1, which are not point identi￿ed.
21The conditional moment inequalities implied by the model are given by
Efpt ￿ (a0 + a1xt + a2Qt)jxt;wtg = 0,
E
￿






















The ￿rst restriction implies that






= Efptxtg ￿ a2EfQtxtg,
a0Efwtg + a1Efxtwtg = Efptwtg ￿ a2EfQtwtg,
from which it is clear that the demand parameters are identi￿ed, barring linear dependence of these
three equations. Furthermore, a0;a1; and a2 can be estimated consistently by their sample analogs.
To use the full identifying power of the restrictions imposed, I apply Proposition 2 to characterize





























identi￿ed yield the following result.12














, are identi￿ed, and that M has full rank. Then ￿ is identi￿ed and the




























































stant across t. Then all that is required is identi￿cation of E[QtjX;W]. If Qt = ￿ (xt;wt) + ￿t, for some

















could then be consistently estimated by kernel estimation, for
example.
227 Application to the Joint Executive Committee
In this section I demonstrate the methodology with an application to data on the Joint Executive
Committee, a late 19th century railway cartel.
7.1 Background and Data
Formed on April 18, 1879, the Joint Executive Committee (henceforth JEC) was a cartel that
sought to sustain cooperation among rail carriers over the so called trunk-line territory between
the Atlantic seaboard and midwest commercial centers.13 Both eastbound and westbound tra¢ c
was monitored and regulated by the cartel, each under di⁄erent organizations within the JEC.
Because the JEC predated the formation of the Interstate Commerce Commission (1887) and the
passage of the Sherman Act (1890), the operation of the cartel was publicly acknowledged, and
detailed accounts of its operation are well-documented by, for example, MacAvoy (1965) and Ulen
(1979).
The dataset is a time series of weekly observations from the beginning of 1880 through the 16th
week of 1886. For each week, tons of grain, ￿ our, and provisions shipped on each of 8 di⁄erent rail
lines from Chicago to the east coast is recorded. These rail lines were owned by the 5 di⁄erent
￿rms that participated in the cartel for at least some subset of the years considered here. These
weekly quantities as well as percentage allotments and cartel prices for each of the goods shipped
were recorded by the JEC itself in order to assist in the task of maintaining collusion. Table 1
provides a description of the variables employed from this dataset, and Table 2 provides various
summary statistics.
Also available is an indicator Lt that equals 1 if the Great Lakes were open to navigation in
week t, and equals zero otherwise. Shipment via lake was the main competitor for rail shipments
during this period, so Lt was an important determinant of demand for rail shipments. As noted
by Porter (1983) and Lee and Porter (1984), one would ideally have data on prices charged for lake
shipments, but this data is not available to me. It is, however, known that the JEC at no point in
time managed to explicitly include the lake shippers in their collusive endeavors.14.
There has been a good deal of prior research on the JEC that has employed the dataset used
here. This includes Porter (1983), Lee and Porter (1984), Cosslett and Lee (1985), Porter (1985),
Berry and Briggs (1988), Hajivassiliou (1989), and Ellison (1994). These studies focus primarily on
examining explicit models of collusion, and the extent to which the observed data can be explained
by particular theoretical models. Their focus is not on the estimation of ￿rms￿marginal costs per
se, and in these studies marginal costs are not estimated. In fact, in this line of research ￿rms￿
13Ulen (1979)
14Ulen (1979, p. 229) notes that the cartel did once discuss the idea of colluding with lake shippers in September
1886, but that this idea was never pursued. One potential reason for this, however, is that some of the lake steamers
were owned by some of the same companies as the railroads.
23Table 1: List of Variables
p price of shipping grain in dollars per 100 lbs.￿￿
Q total quantity of grain shipped, in tons.￿￿
qi quantity of grain shipped by ￿rm i, in tons.
Ai market share allotment for ￿rm i as dictated by the JEC.
L 1 if Great Lakes were open for shipping, 0 otherwise.￿￿
S1 seasonal dummy; 1 if observation is from Q2, 0 otherwise.
S2 seasonal dummy; 1 if observation is from Q3, 0 otherwise.
S3 seasonal dummy; 1 if observation is from Q4, 0 otherwise.
DM1 1 from week 28 in 1880 to week 10 in 1883, 0 otherwise;
re￿ ecting entry by the Grand Trunk Railway.￿￿
DM2 1 from week 11 in 1883 to week 25 in 1883, 0 otherwise;
re￿ ecting an addition to the New York Central.￿￿
DM3 1 from week 26 in 1883 to week 11 in 1886, 0 otherwise;
re￿ ecting entry by the Chicago and Atlantic.￿￿
DM4 1 from week 12 in 1886 to week 16 in 1886, 0 otherwise;
re￿ ecting departure of the Chicago and Atlantic from the JEC.￿￿
* The Sample is from week 1 in 1880 to week 16 in 1886.
** Source: Porter (1983), Table 1.
equilibrium conditions have been aggregated in such a way so that marginal cost parameters may
not be identi￿ed by the model used, unless further assumptions are imposed. Here, rather than
posit a particular theory of collusive behavior, I entertain a wide range of possibilities, and my
focus is primarily on the estimation of marginal cost parameters. Of course, in a model that yields
precise inference of marginal cost parameters, much could potentially be said about the magnitude
of ￿rms￿markups and the extent to which they compete or collude.
7.2 Demand Speci￿cation and Estimation
I take the functional form of Porter (1983) for the market demand equation as a starting point,
but relax the assumption of normal errors. Instead, I assume that the demand unobservable has
zero expectation conditional on L and the season dummies S = (S1;S2;S3)
0. Market demand in
period t is assumed to have the log-linear form
lnQt = ￿0 + ￿1 lnpt + ￿2Lt +
5 P
j=3
￿jSj￿2;t + ut. (D1)
The functional form di⁄ers from that of Porter (1983) only in that I employ three rather than twelve
seasonal dummies, dividing the calendar into quarters rather than four week periods. This structure
is imposed to make the large sample approximations for the supply side of the market reasonable
with the available data. Each Lake, Season combination implies two moment inequalities for each





p .2465 .25 .06653 .125 .40
Q 25384 23101 11632 4810 76407
L .6189 1 .4864 0 1
q1 13111 12722 6303 2403 35973
q2 5846 4961 3413 1291 24258
q3 2201 1716 1611 189 11277
q￿
4 3098 2690 2053 0 9592
q￿
5 3197 2810 2204 0 13732
* Firm 4 was active from week 28 through the end of the sample.
** Firm 5 was active from week 182 through week 323.
The mean, median, and standard deviation for ￿rms 4 and 5 are
reported conditional on that ￿rm being active.
￿rm; dividing the year into thirteen seasons rather than four results in some Lake, Season pairs
with too few observations to expect reliable inference.
Furthermore, I allow ut to be governed by an AR(1) process, as in Ellison (1994) and Cosslett
and Lee (1985), who found signi￿cant serial correlation in the demand errors. That is, I impose
that
ut = ￿ ￿ ut￿1 + ￿t, (7.1)
where ￿t is iid and ￿ is estimated as a parameter of the model. I maintain the assumption that ut,
and thus ut￿1 and ￿t are uncorrelated with both Lt and all the season dummies, and I use a two step
e¢ cient GMM procedure to estimate the parameters of the demand equation and the autoregressive
parameter separately from the marginal cost parameters. The variables DM1;DM2;DM3;DM4
and the allotments of four of the ￿rms are used as instruments for lnpt; that is, I make use of the
moment equation E[ujDMj;Ak] = 0 for j = 1;:::;4 and k = 1;:::;4.15.
I also consider the speci￿cation
lnQt = ￿0 + ￿1 lnpt + ￿2Lt +
5 P
j=3
￿jSj￿2;t + ￿6Lt lnpt + ut, (D2)
along with the AR(1) process for the error term of (7.1). This allows for the elasticity of market
demand to vary with whether or not the Great Lakes were open for shipment. Again the parameters
are estimated by an e¢ cient GMM procedure, and ￿rm allotments interacted with L are used as
additional instruments. The estimation results of both speci￿cations are reported in Table 3.
The estimates from the more ￿ exible demand speci￿cation suggest that demand was in fact
15Only the allotments of the ￿rst four ￿rms are used because the sum of all ￿rms￿allotments is 1 by de￿nition.





￿0 (const) 8.9655￿￿￿ 9.6226￿￿￿
(0:1671) (0:1317)
￿1 (ln pt) -0.9143￿￿￿ -0.4157￿￿
(0:2449) (0:1848)
￿2 (Lake dummy) -0.4374￿￿￿ -2.1148￿￿￿
(0:1232) (0:0879)
￿3 (Q2 dummy) 0.1229￿ 0.1510￿￿
(0:0738) (0:0605)
￿4 (Q3 dummy) -0.1278￿ -0.0906
(0:074) (0:0569)
￿5 (Q4 dummy) 0.076 0.0723
(0:0732) (0:0553)




￿￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 0.01 level.
￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 0.05 level.
￿ denotes signi￿cance at the 0.10 level.
26considerably more elastic when the lakes were open for navigation. This ￿nding seems reasonable;
when the lakes were open, the railway prices for grain shipping may have been, at least to some
extent, constrained by the prices of lake shippers, making quantity more sensitive to price changes
in those periods. A further di⁄erence between the two sets of demand estimates is the estimated
autoregressive parameter ￿. The estimate is roughly 3 times as high when demand elasticity is
assumed constant across all periods, although it is very highly statistically signi￿cant under both
speci￿cations. The autoregressive parameter has no bearing on marginal cost estimates, however.
I proceed to estimate marginal costs under each of the demand speci￿cations, separately for
each of the three ￿rms that are active over the entire dataset. It is important to note that given
these functional form speci￿cations, the conduct parameter method, which assumes ￿it = ￿i for
each ￿rm i and all t, identi￿es none of the ￿i nor the marginal cost parameters, even when marginal
costs are assumed constant. Due to the lack of marginal cost shifters, marginal costs cannot be
separately identi￿ed from ￿i. The methodology of this paper is, however, still applicable.
7.3 Marginal Cost Speci￿cation and Estimation
I consider two di⁄erent speci￿cations for ￿rms￿marginal cost functions, the ￿rst being constant
marginal costs, and the second being linear marginal costs. There are no observed marginal cost
shifters aside from quantity, which is endogenous. The speci￿cation is
mc(qit) = c0i + ￿it, (7.2)
when marginal costs are assumed constant, and
mc(qit) = c0i + c1iqit + ￿it, (7.3)
when marginal costs are assumed to be linear. ￿it is an unobserved marginal cost shifter such
that E[￿itjL;S] = 0. The composite vector of ￿rms￿marginal cost parameters to be estimated is
￿ = (c01;c02;c03)
0 when marginal costs are given by (7.2) and ￿ = (c01;c11;c02;c12;c03;c13) when
marginal costs are given by (7.3). The units of the variables are such that mc(qit) is measured in
dollars per 100 pounds of grain. It is assumed throughout that all components of ￿ are nonnegative.


























= (0;sit). Given the demand speci￿cation, it















where ￿t is the elasticity of aggregate demand in period t: Under (D1), ￿t is given by
￿t = ￿1,
while under (D2),
￿t = ￿1 + ￿6Lt.
Looking at the estimated values of the demand equation, the estimated elasticity under the ￿rst
speci￿cation is constant at ^ ￿1 = ￿0:9143, while under the second speci￿cation, the demand elastic-
ity is ￿0:4157 when the Great Lakes are closed and ￿1:5472 when the Great Lakes are open. From
(7.5), and more generally from Proposition 1, it is clear that the bounds on mcit, are smaller when
demand is more elastic. Thus, the di⁄erence in demand elasticities under the two speci￿cations
should be expected to have an e⁄ect on marginal cost parameter estimates. However, the direction
of this di⁄erence is not clear a priori, since demand is more elastic under (D1) when the Lakes
are closed than under (D2), but demand is more elastic under (D2) than (D1) when the Lakes are
open. The e⁄ect of the di⁄erent estimates for demand elasticity is re￿ ected in the estimates of the
marginal cost parameters in the remainder of this section.
In this model, Proposition 2 implies that the identi￿ed set for the marginal cost parameters ￿




















Because the Great Lakes were always open in Q3, and always closed in Q1, there are six Lake,
Season combinations observed in the sample. As a result, (7.6) yields twelve moment inequalities
for each ￿rm, two for each Lake, Season combination. The set of parameter values that comprise
the identi￿ed set, B￿ are those values of ￿ such that each ￿rm￿ s marginal cost parameters satisfy
each of these twelve moment inequalities. In the case of constant marginal costs, with speci￿cation








































287.3.1 Marginal Cost Estimates Given Demand Speci￿cation 1
First, I estimate the identi￿ed set for marginal cost parameters when demand is assumed to be given
by (D1)16. Table 4 shows the estimated bounds on marginal costs for ￿rms 1-3 when marginal costs
are assumed constant. Under the assumption that ￿it 2 [0;1] for all t, the bounds on marginal
costs for each ￿rm are identical, ranging from marginal costs of 0 to 22c /. In this case, there is
no ￿rm speci￿c component to (7.5), as neither marginal costs nor the bounds on marginal costs
implied from the demand estimates depend on ￿rms￿quantities produced. When, however, it is
instead assumed that ￿it 2 [0;sit], where sit is ￿rm i￿ s period t market share, the restriction (7.5)
does have di⁄erent implications for each of the ￿rms, and the estimated bounds are substantially
smaller. Furthermore, the restriction that ￿it 2 [0;sit] embeds perfect competition and Cournot
Equilibrium as polar cases. Under this restriction, the marginal costs of ￿rm 2 have a very narrow
estimated identi￿cation region, falling between 21:8c / and 22c /, with a 95% con￿dence interval of
[20:6c /; 23:1c /]. Turning to ￿rm 3, the estimated identi￿ed set for c03 is empty, as is the associated
95% con￿dence interval. For ￿rm 3, the data are found to be inconsistent with all of the restrictions
of the model, at the 95% level. The value of c03 closest to satisfying the imposed restrictions is
22:4c /.
Now I turn to estimation of marginal cost parameters under the linear speci￿cation (7.3). The
estimated identi￿ed set for the marginal cost parameters (c0i;c1i), are depicted graphically for each
￿rm i in ￿gures 1 ￿ 3. The ￿gures illustrate very clearly the identifying power of the assumption
￿it 2 [0;sit] relative to ￿it 2 [0;1], as the estimated identi￿ed sets are much smaller under the former
assumption for each of the ￿rms. Comparing the estimates across each of the three ￿rms, judging
by the shape of the identi￿ed set, it seems that ￿rm 1￿ s marginal costs are potentially the least
sensitive to quantity, while ￿rm 3￿ s are potentially the most sensitive. This re￿ ects the variation
in each ￿rms￿quantity produced relative to the bounds on marginal costs implied by (7.5). Under
the restriction that ￿it 2 [0;sit], the estimated identi￿ed set for ￿rm 2￿ s marginal cost parameters
is very informative, with the slope of ￿rm 2￿ s marginal cost function estimated to be no greater
than approximately 0.000007.17 Interestingly, in the case of ￿rm 3, the speci￿cation of constant
marginal costs was rejected at the 95% level, but when marginal costs are allowed to be linear in
quantity, the model is no longer rejected at the 95% level, although no value of the marginal cost
parameters yields a value of 0 for the sample objective function. The parameter values that yielded




16The reported estimates for the identi￿ed set are those values of the marginal cost parameter(s) ￿ such that
^ QT (￿) ￿ 0:0001. This cuto⁄ was chosen to match the degree of computation error allowed by Matlab￿ s minimization
algorithm.
17The slope parameter c1i measures the e⁄ect of increasing quantity by one ton on ￿rm i￿ s marginal costs measured
in dollars per 100 pounds shipped. Because quantities shipped were as high as tens of thousands of tons for each
￿rm, values of c1i on the order of 10
￿5 are economically signi￿cant. For example, a value of c12 of 0.000007 would
contribute about 4c / to marginal costs at ￿rm 2￿ s mean quantity of 5846 tons.
29Table 4: Estimated bounds and con￿dence intervals for ￿rms￿marginal costs under the assumption
that marginal costs are constant, for the constant elasticity demand speci￿cation (D1). The units
of the estimated bounds are dollars per 100 pounds of grain shipped.
[mc, mc] 75% CI 95% CI
Firm 1: ￿it 2 [0;1] [0;0:220] [0;0:226] [0;0:231]
￿it 2 [0;sit] [0:118;0:220] [0:111;0:226] [0:106;0:231]
Firm 2: ￿it 2 [0;1] [0;0:220] [0;0:226] [0;0:231]
￿it 2 [0;sit] [0:218;0:220] [0:211;0:226] [0:205;0:231]
Firm 3: ￿it 2 [0;1] [0;0:220] [0;0:226] [0;0:231]
￿it 2 [0;sit] ; (0:224)
￿ ; ;
￿ denotes the unique value at which the sample objective function is minimized.
7.3.2 Marginal Cost Estimates Given Demand Speci￿cation 2
Now I consider the implications of using the estimates from demand speci￿cation 2 to estimate the
identi￿ed set for marginal cost parameters. Again, I begin by considering the constant marginal
costs speci￿cation, and these results are reported in table 5. In contrast to the estimates under
(D1), the presence of the interaction term in the demand speci￿cation leads to rejection of marginal
costs being 0 for each of the three ￿rms. This conclusion is driven by the periods in which the
lakes were open, as the demand elasticity was su¢ ciently high in those periods to indicate that,
were the ￿rms actually engaging in perfectly collusive behavior, their implied marginal costs would
still be well above zero. Furthermore, the change in demand elasticities has no e⁄ect on the upper
bounds of the estimated marginal costs. This is because the upper bound on marginal costs is
derived from setting ￿it at its lower bound for each observation. This lower bound is 0 for both
cases considered, which cancels the e⁄ect of the demand elasticity. If the lower bound on ￿it were
non-zero, the di⁄erent elasticity would have had an e⁄ect on the upper bound on marginal costs.
For the case where ￿it 2 [0;sit], using the estimated demand elasticities from (D2) does change
the implied lower bound on marginal costs, but the direction of the e⁄ect, relative to the estimates
under (D1), is not uniform across ￿rms. For ￿rm 1, the estimated lower bound changes from 11:8c /
to 16:6c /, while for ￿rm 2 the lower bound decreases from 21:8c / to 19:6c /. For ￿rm 3, there is still
30Table 5: Estimated bounds and con￿dence intervals for ￿rms￿marginal costs under the assumption
that marginal costs are constant, for demand speci￿cation (D2), where elasticity is allowed to
depend on whether or not the Great Lakes are open for shipment.
[mc, mc] 75% CI 95% CI
Firm 1: ￿it 2 [0;1] [0:086;0:220] [0:081;0:226] [0:078;0:231]
￿it 2 [0;sit] [0:166;0:220] [0:161;0:226] [0:155;0:231]
Firm 2: ￿it 2 [0;1] [0:086;0:220] [0:081;0:226] [0:078;0:231]
￿it 2 [0;sit] [0:196;0:220] [0:190;0:226] [0:186;0:231]
Firm 3: ￿it 2 [0;1] [0:086;0:220] [0:081;0:226] [0:078;0:231]
￿it 2 [0;sit] ; (0:223)
￿ [0:221;0:226] [0:216;0:231]
￿ denotes the unique value at which the sample objective function is minimized.
no value of c01 that satis￿es all of the restrictions of the model, but now that the interaction term
has been included in the demand speci￿cation, constant marginal costs are no longer rejected at
reasonable levels.
Turning now to the set estimates for the parameters of the linear marginal cost speci￿cation, we
immediately see from ￿gures 4-6 that zero marginal costs are rejected for each of the three ￿rms,
as the origin is always excluded. Again, there is a large di⁄erence between the estimated identi￿ed
sets for the two restrictions on ￿rms￿markups. Interestingly, the shapes of implied identi￿ed sets
do not change by much.
As was the case when demand speci￿cation D1 was imposed, there exist no parameter values
for ￿rm 3￿ s marginal cost function at which the sample objective function takes the value zero
under the assumption that 0 ￿ ￿3t ￿ sit. However, the speci￿cation is not rejected at the 95%
level, and in contrast to the results of section 7.3.1, constant marginal costs cannot be rejected.
The parameter values that minimize the sample objective function for ￿rm 3 in this case are
(c03;c13) =
￿
0:199; 1:3 ￿ 10￿5￿
.
318 Conclusion
This paper provides a methodology for estimating ￿rms￿marginal cost functions under relatively
lax restrictions on ￿rm behavior in an oligopoly setting. The empirical literature has long recog-
nized that empirical results may be sensitive to the particular equilibrium assumptions imposed.
To the extent that it is unclear how ￿rms actually make their strategic decisions in any given mar-
ket, imposing assumptions on ￿rm behavior may be problematic, and could lead to inconsistent
parameter estimates. The methodology of this paper allows the empirical researcher to relax po-
tentially unveri￿able assumptions on ￿rm behavior, and determine what conclusions can be drawn
even if the remaining assumptions are insu¢ cient for point identi￿cation. If more restrictions can
be credibly imposed regarding ￿rm behavior across observations, then this framework provides a
starting point for evaluating the impact of those additional restrictions.
References
Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stachetti (1986): ￿Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect
Monitoring,￿Journal of Economic Theory, 39, 251￿ 269.
Andrews, D. K., S. T. Berry, and P. Jia (2004): ￿Con￿dence Regions for Parameters in
Discrete Games with Multiple Equilibria, with an Application to Discount Chain Store Location,￿
working paper, Yale University.
Bajari, P., C. L. Benkard, and J. Levin (forthcoming): ￿Estimating Dynamic Models of
Imperfect Competition,￿.
Beresteanu, A., and F. Molinari (2006): ￿Asymptotic Properties for a Class of Partially
Identi￿ed Models,￿working paper, Cornell University.
Berry, S., and H. Briggs (1988): ￿A Non-parametric Test of a First-Order Markov Process for
Regimes in a Non-cooperatively Collusive Industry,￿Economics Letters, 27, 73￿ 77.
Borzekowski, R., and A. M. Cohen (2005): ￿Estimating Strategic Complementarities in Credit
Unions￿Outsourcing Decisions,￿working paper, Federal Reserve Board of Governors.
Bresnahan, T. F. (1982): ￿The Oligopoly Solution Concept is Identi￿ed,￿Economics Letters,
10, 87￿ 92.
(1987): ￿Competition and Collusion in the American Automobile Industry: the 1955 Price
War,￿Journal of Industrial Economics, 35(4), 457￿ 482.
32(1989): ￿Empirical Studies of Industries with Market Power,￿ in The Handbook of In-
dustrial Organization, ed. by R. Schmalansee, and R. Willing, vol. 2, chap. 17. Elsevier Science
Publishers B.V., Amsterdam.
Chernozhukov, V., H. Hong, and E. Tamer (2004): ￿Parameter Set Inference in a Class of
Econometric Models,￿working paper, Princeton University.
Ciliberto, F., and E. Tamer (2004): ￿Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline
Markets,￿working paper, Northwestern University.
Corts, K. S. (1999): ￿Conduct Parameters and the Measurement of Market Power,￿Journal of
Econometrics, 88, 227￿ 250.
Cosslett, S. R., and L.-F. Lee (1985): ￿Serial Correlation in Latent Discrete Variable Models,￿
The Journal of Econometrics, 27, 79￿ 97.
Ellison, G. (1994): ￿Theories of Cartel Stability and the Joint Executive Committee,￿ Rand
Journal of Economics, 25(1), 37￿ 57.
Gasmi, F., J. Laffont, and Q. Vuong (1992): ￿Econometric Analysis of Collusive Behavior in
a Soft-Drink Market,￿Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1, 277￿ 311.
Genesove, D., and W. P. Mullin (1998): ￿Testing Static Oligopoly Models: Conduct and Cost
in the Sugar Industry,￿Rand Journal of Economics, 29(2), 355￿ 377.
Graddy, K. (1995): ￿Testing for Imperfect Competition at the Fulton Fish Market,￿Rand Journal
of Economics, 26(1), 75￿ 92.
Green, E. J., and R. H. Porter (1984): ￿Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price
Information,￿Econometrica, 52, 87￿ 100.
Haile, P. A., and E. Tamer (2003): ￿Inference with an Incomplete Model of English Auctions,￿
Journal of Political Economy, 111(1), 1￿ 51.
Hajivassiliou, V. A. (1989): ￿Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Price Fixing Behaviour,￿work-
ing paper, Cowles Foundation, Yale University.
Iwata, G. (1974): ￿Measurement of Conjectural Variations in Oligopoly,￿Econometrica, 42, 947￿
966.
Lau, L. (1982): ￿On Identifying the Degree of Competitiveness From Industry Price and Output
Data,￿Economics Letters, 10, 93￿ 99.
33Lee, L.-F., and R. H. Porter (1984): ￿Switching Regression Models with Imperfect Sample
Separation Information ￿with an Application on Cartel Stability,￿Econometrica, 52(2), 391￿
418.
MacAvoy, P. W. (1965): The Economic E⁄ects of Regulation. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Manski, C. F. (2003): Partial Identi￿cation of Probability Distributions. Springer-Verlag, New
York.
Manski, C. F., and E. Tamer (2002): ￿Inference on Regressions with Interval Data on a Regressor
or Outcome,￿Econometrica, 70(2), 519￿ 546.
Mas-Colell, A., M. D. Whinston, and J. R. Green (1995): Microeconomic Theory. Oxford
University Press, New York.
Nevo, A. (1998): ￿Identi￿cation of the Oligopoly Solution Concept in a Di⁄erentiated-Products
Industry,￿Economics Letters, 59, 391￿ 395.
(2000): ￿A Practitioner￿ s Guide to Estimation of Random-Coe¢ cients Logit Models of
Demand,￿Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 9(4), 513￿ 548.
Pakes, A., M. Ostrovsky, and S. Berry (2005): ￿Simple Estimators for Parameters of Discrete
Dynamic Games (with Entry/Exit Examples),￿working paper, Harvard University.
Pakes, A., J. Porter, K. Ho, and J. Ishii (2006): ￿The Method of Moments with Inequality
Constraints,￿working paper, Harvard University.
Porter, R. H. (1983): ￿A Study of Cartel Stability: The Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886,￿
Bell Journal of Economics, 14, 301￿ 314.
(1985): ￿On the Incidence and Duration of Price Wars,￿Journal of Industrial Economics,
33(4), 415￿ 426.
Rosen, A. (2005): ￿Con￿dence Sets for Partially Identi￿ed Parameters that Satisfy a Finite
Number of Moment Inequalities,￿working paper, Northwestern University.
Rosse, J. N. (1970): ￿Estimating Cost Function Parameters Without Using Cost Data: Illustrated
Methodology,￿Econometrica, 38(2), 256￿ 275.
Rotemberg, J. J., and G. Saloner (1986): ￿A Supergame Theoretic Model of Price Wars
During Booms,￿American Economic Review, 76, 390￿ 407.
Rubinovitz, R. N. (1993): ￿Market Power and Price Increases for Basic Cable Service Since
Deregulation,￿Rand Journal of Economics, 24(1), 1￿ 18.
34Salvo, A. (2005): ￿Inferring Conduct Under the Threat of Entry, The Case of the Brazilian
Cement Industry,￿working paper, Northwestern University.
Shaikh, A. M. (2005): ￿Inference for Partially Identi￿ed Econometric Models,￿working paper,
Stanford University.
Sweeting, A. (2005): ￿Coordination Games, Multiple Equilibria and the Timing of Radio Com-
mercials,￿working paper, Northwestern University.
Tamer, E. (2003): ￿Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Models with Multiple Equilibria,￿
Review of Economic Studies, 70(1), 147￿ 167.
Ulen, T. S. (1979): ￿Cartels and Regulation,￿Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University.
Wolfram, C. D. (1999): ￿Measuring Duopoly Power in the British Electricity Spot Market,￿
American Economic Review, 89(4), 805￿ 826.
Appendix A: Proofs
8.1 Proposition 1






such that pt ￿ mcit + ￿itQt
@P
@Q (Qt;xt;￿) = 0, or equivalently,
mc(qit;w;￿i) = P (Qt;xt;￿) + ￿itQt
@P
@Q
(Qt;xt;￿) + ut ￿ ￿it.
Taking expectations over (qt;pt;￿it;ut;￿t) conditional on (x;w) implies










































mci (x;w) ￿ E[mc(qi;w;￿i)jx;w] ￿ mci (x;w).
358.2 Proposition 2
Proof. From Proposition 1,
mci (x;w) ￿ E[mc(qi;w;￿i)jx;w] ￿ mci (x;w)
for all (x;w) 2 (X;W), for each i = 1;:::;N. Under the additive separability assumption A5, this
becomes
mci (x;w) ￿ f (w;￿i) + E[g (qi;￿i)jX;W] ￿ mci (x;w).
for all (x;w) 2 (X;W), for each i = 1;:::;N. The identi￿cation region for ￿ is then given by the
set of values of ￿ consistent with this statement with probability 1:
8.2.1 Corollary 1
Proof. This is a direct implication of Proposition 2 as @P
@Q (Q;x;￿) = 0 implies that mci (x;w) =
mci (x;w) = E[ptjx;w], so that E[mc(qi;w;￿i)jx;w] = E[ptjx;w] for any (x;w) pair such that
@P
@Q (Q;x;￿) = 0 with probability 1 conditional on (x;w).
8.2.2 Corollary 2
Proof. Let ￿0;￿00 2 B￿ and de￿ne ￿￿ = ￿￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿00 for some ￿ 2 [0;1]. Fix i. For any
￿ 2 B￿ it follows that
mci (x;w) ￿ ￿iqE[qijx;w] + w0￿iw ￿ mci (x;w)
so that
￿ ￿ mci (x;w) ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿0




￿ ￿ ￿ mci (x;w)
and
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ mci (x;w) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿00
iqE[qijx;w] + w0 ￿
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿00
iw
￿
￿ (1 ￿ ￿) ￿ mci (x;w)
hold. Combining these two inequalities yields
mci (x;w) ￿ ￿iqE[qijx;w] + w0￿iw ￿ mci (x;w).
This shows that the set
f￿i : mci (x;w) ￿ f (w;￿i) + E[g (qi;￿i)jx;w] ￿ mci (x;w)g
36is convex. Since B￿ is an intersection of sets of this form over the support of (x;w) and across i,
B￿ is convex.
8.3 Proposition 3
Proof. The result follows directly from taking expectations of the inequalities (3.5) and (3.6)
conditional on covariates (x;w) as in (4.3) and imposing Qj (p;x;￿) = ￿pj ￿ p + h(￿xj;x). Doing
so gives
E[pjjx;w] + D￿1




￿ E[pjjx;w] + D￿1






Dkj (pk ￿ mck (w;￿k))jx;w
3
5.
The set B￿ is exactly the set of ￿ that satisfy all of these inequalities for all J di⁄erentiated products
over the support of X;W with probability 1. Any value of ￿ that satis￿es both (3.5) and (3.6)
belongs to this set by construction.
8.3.1 Corollary 3
Proof. Let ￿0;￿00 2 B￿ and ￿￿ = ￿￿0 + (1 ￿ ￿)￿00 for some ￿ 2 [0;1]. Then under the restriction
that mcj (w;￿) = wj ￿ ￿j, it follows that w.p. 1 (X;W),
E[pjjX;W] + D￿1
jj ￿pj ￿ E[(p)jX;W]+h(￿xj;X) ￿ Wj ￿ ￿0
j ￿
E[pjjX;W] + D￿1
















jj ￿pj ￿ E[(p)jX;W]+h(￿xj;X) ￿ Wj ￿ ￿00
j ￿
E[pjjX;W] + D￿1














Multiplying the ￿rst inequality by ￿ the second by (1 ￿ ￿) and summing them yields
E[pjjX;W] + D￿1
jj ￿pj ￿ E[(p)jX;W]+h(￿xj;X) ￿ Wj ￿ ￿￿ ￿
E[pjjX;W] + D￿1













so that ￿￿ 2 B￿.
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(a) 0 < θ1t < 1 (b) 0 < θ1t < s1t



















(a) 0 < θ1t < 1 (a) 0 < θ1t < 1 (b) 0 < θ1t < s1t (b) 0 < θ1t < s1t
Figure 1: The estimated identi￿ed set and 95% con￿dence set for the marginal cost parameters of
￿rm 1, using demand speci￿cation (D1). The estimated identi￿ed set is shown in light blue, and
additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con￿dence region are shown in dark blue. (a)
depicts the identi￿ed set under the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿1t ￿ 1, and (b) the identi￿ed set under
the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿1t ￿ s1t.
38(a) 0 < θ2t < 1



















(b) 0 < θ2t < s2t (a) 0 < θ2t < 1



















(b) 0 < θ2t < s2t
Figure 2: The estimated identi￿ed set and 95% con￿dence set for the marginal cost parameters of
￿rm 2, using demand speci￿cation (D1). The estimated identi￿ed set is shown in light blue, and
additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con￿dence region are shown in dark blue. (a)
depicts the identi￿ed set under the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿2t ￿ 1, and (b) the identi￿ed set under
the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿2t ￿ s2t.



















(a) 0 < θ3t < 1 (b) 0 < θ3t < s3t



















(a) 0 < θ3t < 1 (b) 0 < θ3t < s3t
Figure 3: The estimated identi￿ed set and 95% con￿dence set for the marginal cost parameters of
￿rm 3, using demand speci￿cation (D1). The estimated identi￿ed set is shown in light blue, and
additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con￿dence region are shown in dark blue. (a)
depicts the identi￿ed set under the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿3t ￿ 1, and (b) the identi￿ed set under
the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿3t ￿ s3t. For case (b), there is no parameter value at which the sample
objective function is zero, but the 95% con￿dence set is non-empty. The point at which the sample
objective function is minimized is
￿
0:178; 2:8 ￿ 10￿5￿
, shown in yellow.



















(a) 0 < θ1t < 1 (b) 0 < θ1t < s1t



















(a) 0 < θ1t < 1 (b) 0 < θ1t < s1t
Figure 4: The estimated identi￿ed set and 95% con￿dence set for the marginal cost parameters of
￿rm 1, using demand speci￿cation (D2). The estimated identi￿ed set is shown in light blue, and
additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con￿dence region are shown in dark blue. (a)
depicts the identi￿ed set under the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿1t ￿ 1, and (b) the identi￿ed set under
the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿1t ￿ s1t.


















(a) 0 < θ2t < 1
Firm 2
(b) 0 < θ2t < s2t


















(a) 0 < θ2t < 1
Firm 2
(b) 0 < θ2t < s2t
Figure 5: The estimated identi￿ed set and 95% con￿dence set for the marginal cost parameters of
￿rm 2, using demand speci￿cation (D2). The estimated identi￿ed set is shown in light blue, and
additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con￿dence region are shown in dark blue. (a)
depicts the identi￿ed set under the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿2t ￿ 1, and (b) the identi￿ed set under
the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿2t ￿ s2t.
42Firm 3
(a) 0 < θ3t < 1 (b) 0 < θ3t < s3t



















(a) 0 < θ3t < 1 (b) 0 < θ3t < s3t


















Figure 6: The estimated identi￿ed set and 95% con￿dence set for the marginal cost parameters of
￿rm 3, using demand speci￿cation (D2). The estimated identi￿ed set is shown in light blue, and
additional parameter values that belong to the 95% con￿dence region are shown in dark blue. (a)
depicts the identi￿ed set under the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿3t ￿ 1, and (b) the identi￿ed set under
the restriction that 0 ￿ ￿3t ￿ s3t. For case (b), there is no parameter value at which the sample
objective function is zero, but the 95% con￿dence set is non-empty. The point at which the sample
objective function is minimized is
￿
0:199; 1:3 ￿ 10￿5￿
, shown in yellow.
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